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1 Introduction
The relation between fertility and child mortality is at the core of historical and modern demographic
transitions. In several demographic transitions, such as those in England, Germany and Sweden in the
nineteenth century and India and many other developing countries more recently, child mortality de-
clines have preceded the transition to smaller family size (Angeles, 2010; Lee, 2003, Figure 3). In such
transitions, the evidence points to a decline in both total and net fertility rates.1 Yet simple versions of
the Barro and Becker (1989) model – the dominant paradigm in the economics of fertility choice – have
trouble delivering declines in the total and net fertility rates when child mortality rates decline (Doepke,
2005). Under the standard assumption of logarithmic preference for the number of surviving children,
a fall in the child mortality rate is absorbed as a fall in the total fertility rate with the net fertility rate
remaining unchanged. As discussed in the in-depth survey by Galor (2011), for the latter to move, one
has to appeal to other assumptions such as precautionary demand for children (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2008).
We propose a static version of the standard Barro-Becker model under logarithmic preferences that
is capable of generating the desired effect in both the total and net fertility rates. The modification is
∗Corresponding author. Tel: +1 541 346 4678. Fax: +1 541 346 1243. Email address: shankhac@uoregon.edu
1The total fertility rate (TFR) is the number of children the average woman bears. The number of surviving children per
woman of child-bearing age is the net fertility rate (NFR).
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the inclusion of social norms regarding family size, whereby families partly base their fertility choice on
a family-size ideal or norm that exists in their social environment.2 Our formulation of fertility norms
is adapted from the conformist norms studied by Akerlof (1997). Multiple fertility equilibria emerge
naturally in our setting. At the highest fertility equilibrium, a fall in the child mortality rate leads to a
decline in both the total and net fertility rates.
Social norms have been known to affect fertility behavior. In his overview of England’s population in
the late nineteenth century Hinde (2003) observes: “Of course, once economic pressure led to smaller
families becoming more common, it is also likely that they became more fashionable . . . Evidence from
the 1911 census data also suggests that the low fertility behaviour of the middle classes spread to other
groups within the population who were closely associated with the middle classes – for example, those
employed in domestic service”. Munshi and Myaux (2006) present more recent evidence that repro-
ductive social norms can explain the inertia of fertility behavior and contraceptive adoption in rural
Bangladesh. La Ferrera et al. (2008) find that the typically smaller family size depicted in Brazilian telen-
ovelas significantly affected actual fertility behavior and especially so among women who were of similar
age to the main characters.
Two theoretical contributions in the literature are related to this note. Palivos (2001) demonstrates
how high fertility can result from a coordination failure when the interaction between agents takes the
form of norms about family size. He then extends it to a dynamic general equilibrium model to estab-
lish value and belief driven non-ergodic development outcomes across nations.3 In Munshi and Myaux’s
(2006) theory, a fertility transition occurs through Bayesian updating as families learn about the social
acceptability of contraceptive use. Neither paper studies the relation between child mortality and fertil-
ity.
2 TheModel
Suppose social norms partially dictate fertility behavior and, in particular, assume people are conformists.
This means even though prospective parents balance their private economic trade-offs in making fertil-
ity choices, they also respond to social norms about “appropriate” family size. They do so by minimizing
their fertility distance from others as best as they can (Akerlof, 1997). Let n denote a household’s fertil-
ity, ns denote the family-size ideal or norm, and dn ≡ |n−ns | be the aforementioned distance. Suppose
there is a continuum of identical households each of whom takes ns as given and faces the optimization
problem
max
c,n
βu(c)+ (1−β)v(φn)−γω(dn)
2David and Sanderson (1987) is a classic treatment of the emergence of the “two-child norm” and how it came to be reflected
in the behavior of many married couples who practiced deliberate fertility control in nineteenth century United States.
3Goto (2008) extends the Palivos model to study the effect of human capital heterogeneity.
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subject to the budget constraint
c+pnn = y,
c ≥ 0, n ≥ 0.
Here u and v are increasing and strictly concave in their arguments, ω is an increasing and (weakly)
convex function, and β,γ ∈ (0,1) are parameters.4 The child survival rate is φ and parents are assumed
to care only about the expected number of surviving children. Household consumption c subsumes
childrens’ and income y is exogenously given. The (expected) cost of raising children consists of δ units
of resources spent on each surviving child, so that the expected cost per child born is pn ≡ φδ. Non-
negativity of parental consumption places an upper bound on fertility at y/pn .5
The role played by social norms is easiest to highlight with some simple functional choices:
u(c)= lnc
v(φn)= ln(φn)= lnφ+ lnn
ω(dn)= |n−ns |
Our choice of the modulus norm suggests that deviations of fertility from the social norm in either direc-
tion (too few or too many children) are equally chastised.
3 No-Norms Equilibrium
As a benchmark, first consider fertility choice when γ= 0. In this case the decision problem is
max
n∈[0,y/pn ]
V (n)≡β ln(y −pnn)+ (1−β) ln(φn),
the first-order condition for which is
− βpn
y −pnn
+ 1−β
n
= 0.
The household’s optimal fertility (TFR) is computed to be n∗ = (1−β) y/φδ from where it is clear that
∂n∗
∂φ
=− (1−β)δy
p2n
< 0.
An increase in child survival, raises the expected cost per child born, and hence, reduces the fertility rate.
The more empirically relevant question is what happens to the net fertility rate (NFR), q, which equals
4The standard logarithmic Barro-Becker preferences are of the formβ ln(c)+(1−β)² lnn+lnV where ² ∈ (0,1) andV is welfare
of surviving children. In our static reformulation with no parental altruism, for γ= 0, our preferences reduce to Barro-Becker’s
or the one adopted in Galor (2011).
5Modeling child-rearing costs as time costs gives qualitatively similar results. The formulation defines norms over childbirths
not survivors. An integer constraint on n is not imposed and the sequential nature of childbirths is also ignored.
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the expected number of surviving children. Since q =φn∗ = (1−β) y/δ, the NFR remains unaffected by
changes in child mortality, a result analogous to Proposition 1 in Doepke (2005) or Section 3 in Galor
(2011). This is why researchers have employed additional mechanisms, such as a precautionary motive
or non-logarithmic preferences to obtain a reduction in the NFR from better child survival.
4 Social Norms Equilibrium
As noted above, a higher child-survival rate induces a first-order reduction, albeit proportionate, in fer-
tility; as such, the product of the two – the NFR – stays unchanged. Why might societal norms carry
with it the potential to bring down the NFR? The basic intuition is that the presence of conformist social
norms would provide a second-order impetus to further restrict fertility. It stands to reason that it may
be possible for n∗ to fall more than proportionately so that the NFR falls.
Assuming γ> 0, rewrite the penalty function as
ω(dn)=
{
(n−ns), when n ≥ ns
(ns −n), when n < ns
.
Define
U1(n)≡V (n)−γ(n−ns), U2(n)≡V (n)−γ(ns −n)
withU1(ns)=U2(ns). Let n∗1 = argmaxU1(n) and n∗2 = argmaxU2(n) where
n∗1 =
(γy +pn)−
√
(γy +pn)2−4(1−β)γpn y
2γpn
,
n∗2 =
(γy −pn)+
√
(γy −pn)2+4(1−β)γpn y
2γpn
.
From the utility functions, it is evident that n∗1 < n∗ < n∗2 . Also, because of the piecewise linearity of the
penalty function, neither n∗1 nor n
∗
2 directly depend (i.e., in partial equilibrium) on the norm, ns . For
n∗1 to be a valid optimal choice, n
∗
1 ≥ ns must hold. Similarly, n∗2 ≤ ns is necessary for n∗2 to be a valid
optimum.
The household’s objective function is simplyU (n)=min{U1(n),U2(n)} which is non-differentiable at
ns . Hence, we rely on Figure 1 to establish optimal choices. Three cases, depending on the size of the
social norm, are presented with the objective function identified in bold and a kink occurring at ns . In
the first panel, since ns < n∗1 < n∗2 ,U reaches a maximum at n∗1 which is the only valid optimal choice. In
fact, this is the optimal choice for all ns ≤ n∗1 . In the second panel, n∗1 < ns < n∗2 , and household utility is
maximized at the kink, ns . In the third panel, the household chooses a fertility of n∗2 for all ns ≥ n∗2 .
Thus a typical household’s fertility choice responds to the social norm according to the following
4
Figure 1: Fertility Equilibria under Social Norms
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map:
ni = f (ns)≡

n∗1 , for ns ≤ n∗1
ns , for ns ∈ [n∗1 ,n∗2 ]
n∗2 for ns ≥ n∗2
. (1)
Intermediate values of the norm completely subjugate the household’s own fertility calculus, driving its
fertility choice away from the no-norms equilibrium, n∗, except in the knife-edge case of ns = n∗. More
extreme values push that choice in the direction of the norm, further away from n∗.
Following Easterlin et al. (1980) and Palivos (2001), let ns = n¯, the cross-sectional average fertility
rate. That is, suppose households operate under a fertility norm that coincides with the mean level of
fertility in the economy. Then, (1) is rewritten as
ni = f (n¯)≡

n∗1 , for n¯ ≤ n∗1
n¯, for n¯ ∈ [n∗1 ,n∗2 ]
n∗2 for n¯ ≥ n∗2
. (2)
4.1 General Equilibrium
Fertility decisions by other households influence household i ’s fertility choice only through the social
norm. We seek a symmetric Nash equilibrium assuming identical households. Such an equilibrium
occurs when ni = n¯ ∀i . Then the general equilibrium fertility level in the economy is described as the
fixed point to n¯ = f (n¯) where f (n¯) is defined in (2). Henceforth, the equilibrium corresponding to n∗2 is
called the high-fertility equilibrium. It is clear that equilibrium fertility is indeterminate – a continuum
of equilibrium levels of fertility are possible – in the interval [n∗1 ,n
∗
2 ]. This multiplicity of equilibria is a
direct consequence of conformist behavior.
Which of these equilibria is selected depends on households’ expectation of others as well as history.
History may be especially important since the survival of societies in pre-industrial times depended on
population growth: faced with high and fluctuating rates of child mortality, high enough rates of child-
birth would have been necessary to avoid the risk of dying out (Retherford, 1985). This would have been
reinforced by the economic value of child labor in traditional agriculture and cottage industries. It is
natural to expect that such a society would have evolved to be pronatalist and coordinated to the high-
fertility equilibrium n∗2 .
4.2 Effect of Child Survival on Net Fertility
At the high-fertility equilibrium, families choose to have fewer children than what the social norm sug-
gests. And yet, they respond to a social pressure of not wanting to fall behind others. Such conformist
behavior leads to excess fertility relative to the no-norms choice, n∗. Ceteris paribus, when child mor-
tality declines, households reduce their fertility bringing it closer to the no-norms choice. In general
equilibrium, the norm adjusts downwards, providing a second impetus to fertility reduction.
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To see this, recall that n∗2 > n∗ = (1−β)y/(φδ). At n∗2 , write the relevant first order condition in terms
of the NFR q as
− βφδ
y −δq +
(1−β)φ
q
=−γ.
Totally differentiating this, we get[
− βδ
y −δq +
1−β
q
]
dφ−
[
βφδ2
(y −δq)2 +
(1−β)φ
q2
]
dq = 0.
The second term inside brackets on the left hand side of this expression is always positive. Hence, clearly
dq/dφ< 0 (i.e., the NFR falls) if the first term inside the brackets on the left hand side is negative, that is,
if
1−β
q
< βδ
y −δq ⇒ n > n
∗
which is true at n∗2 . In other words, at the high-fertility equilibrium not only does the TFR decline from
better child survival, the NFR does too.6
5 Conclusion
Multiple equilibrium levels of fertility inevitably open the door for population control policies. If it rea-
sonable to expect high-fertility societies have historically coordinated on the high-fertility equilibrium,
then the model suggests (with the usual caveats) that targeting child survival may be an effective policy
instrument.
Whether or not social norms about family size can explain observed declines in fertility behavior is,
ultimately, a quantitative issue. While the empirical evidence suggests so, it remains to be explored if this
mechanism is a substantive explanation of the demographic transition. We also leave to future work the
issue of how social norms evolved towards pronatalism in pre-industrial times.
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